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[Bulk Commodities] Nine years in chemical futures and spot: the most expensive arbitrage lesson I've seen, part two — processing fees can bury you too

Yuki Tanaka
Published on 2026-11-13

[Bulk Commodities] Nine years in chemical futures and spot: the most expensive arbitrage lesson I've seen, part two — processing fees can bury you too

In the last lesson, J got caught off guard on a 2020 methanol futures-spot contango trade when storage fees spiked, and he lost enough to slap his own thigh in frustration. Looking back, he blamed it on the pandemic, that black swan, figuring his logic was perfectly fine as long as there was no extreme market move.

A lot of people reading that probably think: J was just a pure speculator who didn't understand the industry. If it had been a real industry veteran, wouldn't they have avoided the arbitrage trap?

In 2021, Old W showed us with real money that the answer is: not necessarily.

Old W is a seasoned polyester salesman, been at it over a decade, knows the upstream and downstream channels inside out. He's not a reckless type like J who only looks at drivers. He understands costs, understands factories' shutdown thresholds, and understands the buying rhythm of downstream yarn mills. In his view, staple fiber processing-fee arbitrage has a "natural anchor." But it was precisely this "understanding" that buried him in the end. This second lesson in commodity futures arbitrage is even more of a sigh than the first.

First, the illusion of a "safety cushion" in processing fees.

Let me briefly explain what the staple fiber processing fee is.

A lot of people don't even know how it's calculated, so let me put up the formula first: processing fee = staple fiber price - (0.855 × PTA price + 0.335 × ethylene glycol price). This is a classic cost-plus pricing model.

The historical data behind this formula is crucial. Before 2021, the staple fiber industry's processing fee level was overall in a fairly comfortable range. From 2017 to 2020, the industry's average annual processing spread held steady at 1,400-1,500 yuan/ton. After deducting roughly 900 yuan/ton in fixed processing costs, the industry's average processing profit could basically stay at a decent level of 500-600 yuan/ton.

So in the eyes of a veteran polyester man like Old W, the staple fiber processing fee has a "natural anchor." The logic is simple: if the processing fee falls below the cost line, factories lose money; lose money long enough and factories cut production; after cutting production, supply contracts and the processing fee rebounds.

In early 2021, the staple fiber processing fee was still high. But starting in March, because demand had been pulled forward earlier, selling pressure in the market surged, and the processing fee shrank all the way down. By the end of May, the industry was broadly in loss territory.

Old W felt the opportunity had come. He started buying staple fiber spot while shorting PTA and EG futures on the board (long staple fiber, short raw materials), starting with just a few hundred tons. His thinking was simple: once it drops below the cost line, the big plants will definitely cut production to defend prices, and as soon as the processing fee bounces even a little, I can get out whole.

Second, adding all the way down, enduring the "darkest moment."

But the market just wouldn't follow the logic.

After Old W bought in, the processing fee didn't rebound at all — it kept smashing downward. By July, the staple fiber processing fee had dropped straight to 637 yuan/ton, a new low since June 2015. What does that mean? At the time, the industry's general processing cost was 800-1,000 yuan/ton; after deducting fixed costs, a 637 yuan processing fee meant the whole industry was bleeding.

During this period, Old W kept adding to his position as losses mounted. He firmly believed that as long as the whole industry was losing money, production cuts would definitely bring a repair in the processing fee. So instead of cutting the position, he just gritted his teeth and held through the floating losses.

The spot position grew without him quite realizing it, from a few hundred tons to several thousand tons.

Comments

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  • Daniel Foster 2026-11-13 14:00
    People online all say arbitrage is steadier than outright directional trades. That's half true — it's steady in that "the shape of the risk has changed," and it also traps you in that "you think there's no risk anymore." The person below, let's call him J. J entered the industry several years before me. He lived through the era when futures-spot arbitrage was practically free money, and he made plenty from arbitrage too. J's philosophy on arbitrage: only look at the driver, don't worry much about the margin. Because in his eyes, arbitrage is a trade with smaller losses and very low risk — when a driver appears, go for it boldly. Before Spring Festival 2020, a new MTO plant came online in the northwest, and on top of Iran's gas restrictions, methanol spot was very tight. Traders stocked up and spot kept climbing; futures, as the holiday approached, raised margin requirements and longs cut positions, so the board weakened instead. Back and forth, the basis got pulled to above +100 yuan/ton. J figured: Spring Festival is when downstream is at its worst, demand returns after the holiday, inventories still need to keep drawing down, so the futures-spot contango — buy spot, short futures — still has a strong driver. J judged the probability of the basis weakening sharply to be low, so before the holiday he opened a big futures-spot contango position. But right after Spring Festival, the pandemic hit, demand collapsed outright, yet not a single cargo ship bound for port was missing. Inventories couldn't be digested, port stocks were pinned around 1 million tons right at the start of the year, crude oil kept drifting lower, and spot was easy to fall and hard to rise — the basis weakened all the way from above +100 and eventually turned into a negative basis. J came back after the holiday and decisively cut the position, losing over 100 points. Compared with outright trades, he lost far fewer points, but with a big position size it didn't matter — this one trade wiped out all of last year's profits. If the story ended there, it would just be one failed pre-holiday call. What I still remember to this day is what came after. Despite the disastrous start, J was still full of confidence and wanted to make it back. By May, the basis of methanol spot against the 09 futures contract had already reached -100-something. J figured the dock's storage capacity was already full, the goods that could be registered as warehouse receipts were limited, and there were so many shorts in paper cargo (spot for forward delivery) that they'd get squeezed sooner or later. He judged that once the spot side tightened, the basis could move back from -100-something. On top of that, with storage fees at 1.5 yuan/ton/day, a basis of -100-something was only a few dozen yuan in cost away from a risk-free contango, so losses were limited — so he jumped into the futures-spot contango again. When it rains, it pours. By the end of May, because of limited capacity at mainstream warehouses and too many ships stuck at the docks, the warehouses announced, to improve turnover, that storage fees would go from 1.5 yuan/ton/day to 3 yuan/ton/day. The market basis weakened on the news, and J took another huge loss and cut. After the storage fee hike, many chemicals looked like they were offering risk-free contango opportunities, and a lot of people opened positions — only to find that even "risk-free" contango loses money. On one hand, to keep goods moving, warehouses limited the number of warehouse receipts that could be registered, meaning you couldn't register receipts and could only sell your goods into the market. On the other hand, only those with downstream channels who could actually take the goods away could sell at a decent price; those without downstream channels could only do a cargo transfer, and the transfer price was over 100 lower than taking delivery. Plenty of futures-spot speculators with no downstream channels ended up having to cut and walk away.
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